Once Russia's initial push to subjugate Ukraine failed in the first weeks of its full-scale invasion, a widespread view prevailed for two years or more: There's no end in sight.
That has changed in recent months for several reasons, with factors ranging from the situation on the battlefield and shifts in public opinion to the election of former U.S. President Donald Trump, who returns to the White House on January 20 and has repeatedly said he would put paid to the biggest armed conflict in Europe since World War II within a day or two.
So, will Russia's war against Ukraine end in 2025?
If an end means a durable peace deal, the answer is no, many analysts say – in part because Russian President Vladimir Putin doesn't want it, regardless of what he claims, unless it leaves Moscow with a degree of dominance over Ukraine that is unacceptable to Kyiv and its backers abroad.
Experts say Putin wants Russia to pose a persistent threat to Ukraine and a challenge to the West, which he casts as the aggressor in a civilizational confrontation.
Ukrainians, meanwhile, don't want a peace deal if it means formally handing territory to Russia and giving up hope of holding Russia to account for its crimes against the country and its people.
"I think we're very, very far from an end to the war," said Nigel Gould-Davies, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
A push for a cease-fire is almost a given, though, in light of Trump's promises to end the war quickly, and negotiations seem more likely than they have since a series of discussions petered out a few months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
"The smart money right now is that [Trump] can probably get the Russians and the Ukrainians to talk to both him and each other," Olga Oliker, program director for Europe and Central Asia at the Crisis Group, told RFE/RL.
"I think that…what we will likely be looking at is some de facto, at least, if not a de jure cease-fire with some degree of negotiation, tacit or explicit, over the course of 2025," Sam Greene, professor at the King's Russia Institute at King's College London and director of democratic resilience at the Center for European Policy Analysis, told RFE/RL.
Land And Security
There are plenty of pitfalls that could stem from a cease-fire, including the risk that Russia could use it as a chance to regroup and attack again unless effective deterrents and protections for Ukraine are in place.
There are also plenty of obstacles to any deal, some of them stemming from seemingly irreconcilable positions on crucial aspects of the conflict.
One of them is territory. A cease-fire agreement seems more likely now than it has in the past in part because of signs that Ukraine, which Oliker said is "tired and exhausted and on the back foot" amid slow and enormously costly but persistent Russian battlefield gains, may be prepared for a deal that would leave much of the land Moscow's forces now occupy under de-facto Russian control on a temporary and unofficial basis.
But that might not be enough for Putin. He and other Russian officials have said that recognition of four mainland Ukraine provinces in their entirety as Russian -- including large portions that Ukraine controls -- is not negotiable, a position that is unacceptable for Kyiv.
An even bigger obstacle is the need for serious, effective security guarantees for Ukraine.
Russia is dead set against Ukraine joining NATO: One of the demands Moscow put forward as a way to avert the full-scale invasion was a binding assurance that Kyiv would never become a member. And analysts say the Kremlin is also almost certain to bristle at any arrangement it can cast as the virtual equivalent of membership in the Western military alliance.
If Kyiv's Western backers "tried to tiptoe around this, to construct something that had the content but not the form of a guarantee, Putin would make clear that would not be acceptable to him, Gould-Davies said.
"It's very, very hard to see what that would look like," he said of a security assurance for Ukraine that would suit both sides.
'His Theory Of Victory'
A major focus of discussion in recent weeks has been the prospect of sending Western troops into Ukraine in the event of a cease-fire. But there are disagreements about this in Europe, and Russia would not be happy with it.
"The Kremlin will not want to see Western troops, NATO troops, in particular, along that line of control of policing a cease-fire," Greene said, because "Russia will want to maintain the power of initiative. It will want to be the one controlling the dial when it comes to escalation;, it will want to be able to keep everybody else, including the Ukrainians in the West, off balance."
"The question is, will [Kyiv and the West] be able to force Moscow into a position where it doesn't have a choice but to accept that kind of an arrangement?" he said.
With Russia advancing on the battlefield, its economy apparently far from collapse despite warning signs, and uncertainty about the future of Western support for Ukraine, that prospect seems distant for the time being.
"At this point, [Putin] believes that his theory of victory is proving itself, that Russia is just in the long term big enough and tough enough to impose costs and incur costs against the smaller adversary, Ukraine, grind it down militarily, and outlast the West politically," Gould-Davies said.
"The thing that could change that and force Putin to take a different view of the future would be if the Trump administration put real pressure, significant major pressure on Putin by threatening costs of continuing the war that would lead Putin to believe that his own regime could be jeopardized," he said.
Beyond suggesting he would use levels of aid to Ukraine as levers of influence over both Kyiv and Moscow, Trump has said little about how he hopes to end the war.
While he waits for Trump's term to begin, Putin seems to be playing a double game, as he often does, sending contradictory messages in almost the same breath: – casting Russia as constructive and prepared for concessions but at the same throwing up barriers to any agreement that might be acceptable to Kyiv and the West.
Case in point: At a 4 ½-hour question- and-answer session live on state TV on December 19, Putin asserted that Russia is ready for compromise on Ukraine -- but also said several things that suggested it isn't.
'Built Around The War'
For one thing, Putin portrayed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy as an illegitimate leader with whom he would not sign a deal. For another, he once again indicated that the so-called Istanbul Communique, a framework agreement floated shortly before talks between Moscow and Kyiv broke down months into the full-scale invasion, must serve as a basis for any negotiations.
"What Putin is saying though is that the terms of that deal, which envisaged an essentially neutered Ukraine --– not just barred from joining NATO, but also demilitarized, and thus a very, very easy target for Russia in the future…has to essentially be at the center of any future peace deal," Russia analyst Mark Galeotti said.
"He's trying to make this process as awkward as possible, while making it sound as if he's as flexible as possible," Galeotti said on his podcast on December 22.
Greene suggested Russia might be prepared to "turn down the violence" and consider a cease-fire, but only if Putin is confident that Moscow could continue to threaten Ukraine and keep its standoff with the West, which he has made a defining feature of his rule, simmering along.
"The Russian economy right now is only functioning because of the war. The Russian political system is now built around the war. It excuses and explains the level of centralization, the level of repression, the level of ideological control, which are going to be things that the Kremlin will be very loathe, if able at all, to countenance pivoting away from," he told RFE/RL. "Even if Russia were to pivot towards a cease-fire, I think it would find itself seeking to maintain the level of confrontation that it currently has with Ukraine, but [also] with the West more broadly."
In propaganda terms, Greene said, "Putin and the Kremlin in general has given itself a significant amount of rhetorical wiggle room. They can define victory, even temporary victory, partial victory, in a number of different ways," he told RFE/RL.
'An Enormous Mistake'
Oliker also indicated that Russia's stated positions on territory and other issues don't necessarily mean a deal would be out of reach if talks take place.
"There is advantage of getting talks started. And once you've gotten them started, people might be willing to make concessions that they don't say they're willing to make when they go in," she said. "You always go in with your maximal position, and you'd be a fool not to."
An agreement may not come to pass in 2025. But if talks are held and a deal is done, analysts warn, Western nations must be careful to avoid congratulating themselves and considering the matter closed.
"Europe's response to any cease-fire agreement will be critically important -- – both for Ukraine and for themselves," Ruth Deyermond, senior lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, said in written comments to RFE/RL.
"With many countries dealing with political turmoil at home (often stoked by Russia), they may be tempted to treat this as an end to the conflict and an opportunity to reset relations with Russia. That would be an enormous mistake," she wrote. "Russia will continue to pose the most serious and immediate conventional and non-conventional threat to European security."
By RFE/RL
